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Measuring International Inequality Aversion 
 
1. Introduction 
As globalisation intensifies, so does the need for evaluating policies from the 
perspective of a global planner. There is no global planner, but considering what she 
would do provides a useful yardstick against which to measure more realistic policy 
interventions. Policy analyses at the global scale are immediately confronted with 
income differences that are greater than in any individual country, and with income 
redistribution policies that are less effective. This paper focuses on the effect of 
income distribution on policy evaluation. While many analysts consider a strictly 
utilitarian welfare function with risk-averse agents, this implies that uncertainty and 
inequality are evaluated with a single parameter – even though they are conceptually 
and numerically different (Carlsson et al., 2005; Saelen et al., 2008). This spells 
trouble for policies that are both risky and affect the income distribution. A 
straightforward generalisation of the welfare function introduces a second parameter, 
so that inequality aversion and risk aversion can assume different numerical values. In 
this paper, I seek to measure the rate of inequality aversion. 
 
The procedure for this is as follows. I assume that the global planner has the power to 
redistribute income from the countries of the OECD to the rest of the world, and that 
this is a measure of inequality aversion at the global scale. As OECD countries 
voluntarily disburse development aid, the measured inequality aversion is that of “the 
OECD”, not that of the world.1 However, a similar model is followed in problems 
such as climate change, where it is proposed to spend money on reducing greenhouse 
gas emissions in the OECD, primarily to the benefit of the poor (Schelling, 1995). 
The measured rate of inequality aversion can be used to evaluate problems in which 
rich countries are the donors and poor countries the beneficiaries. Applying the 
measured inequality aversion in other contexts should be done with great care, if at 
all. 
 
 
1 Alternatively, this could be interpreted as altruism (cf. Johansson-Stenman, 2005). 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 defines inequity aversion, drawing on 
previous research. Section 3 presents the exact method of measurement, combining 
the literature in Section 2 with another literature on income redistribution. Section 4 
presents the empirical findings. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Defining inequity aversion 
Consider a social welfare function in the sense of Bergson (1938) and Samuelson 
(1975): 
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where W is social welfare, Ui is utility of actors i=1,2,…,I, and ω is a parameter, that 
can be interpreted as the pure rate of inequity aversion (see Boadway and Bruce, 
1984). At the margin, an increase in utility for a relatively happy actor r compares to a 
utility increase for relatively unhappy actor p (Ur>Up) as 
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That is, for ω=0, the social planner is indifferent between the actors, regardless of 
their initial utility. For ω>0 (ω<0), the social planner prefers an increase in the utility 
of the relatively unhappy (happy) actor over an increase in the utility of the relatively 
happy (unhappy) actor. The strength of this preference is larger for a larger absolute 
value of ω, so that ω is indeed a measure of aversion against inequity in the 
distribution of utility. This is underlined if one considers that 
(3) { } { }lim min ; lim maxi ii iW U Wω ω↑∞ ↓−∞= = U  
That is, in the limits, the welfare function equals either the Rawlsian maximin welfare 
function or the Nietzschean maximax welfare function. 
Now consider a CRRA utility function 
(4) 
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where C is consumption and η is the rate of risk aversion. 
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Then the social planner evaluates a relative shift in consumption as 
(5) 
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Note that (5) introduces the consumption rate of inequity aversion: η+ω(1-η). For η 
=0, the pure rate of inequity aversion (ω) equals the consumption rate of inequity 
aversion (η+ω(1-η)). For ω=0, the (social) consumption rate of inequity aversion 
equals the (individual) rate of risk aversion. For other values of η and ω, pure inequity 
aversion, consumption inequity aversion, and risk aversion are numerically different. 
 
3. Measuring international inequity aversion in the OECD 
Okun’s (1975) “leaky bucket” is a frequently used method to estimate inequity 
aversion within countries (e.g., Amiel et al., 1999). The basic thought is that an 
inequity-averse social planner would take from the rich and give to the poor. If it were 
costless to redistribute income, then everyone would have the same income (or the 
social planner would be inequity-neutral). However, if only a fraction of the income 
taken from the rich reaches the poor, then it is possible to have both an unequal 
income distribution and an inequity-averse social planner. The metaphor arises 
because the social planner uses a “leaky bucket” to transfer income. The leakier the 
bucket, the more unequal is the optimal income distribution given a degree of inequity 
aversion. Vice versa, the degree of inequity aversion, implied by the assumption that 
the observed income distribution is optimal, increases as the bucket gets leakier. 
 
I here measure the degree of inequity aversion of countries in the OECD, implied by 
the official development aid given to developing countries. Note the leap of faith. I 
assume that the OECD collectively acts as a global planner when deciding to aid 
developing countries. I need one additional assumption, namely that the global 
planner is only interested in distributional issues between countries, but not within 
countries. Note that there are few data on how aid is distributed across the income 
distribution in developing countries. Then, the global welfare function becomes: 
(6) 
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where ci is average per capita consumption in country i and Pi is the number of people 
in that country. Equation (6) follows from assuming that the global planner considers 
each individual separately but evaluates each individual in a country at the country 
average per capita income. 
 
With this assumption, for any level and pattern of aid, for any degree of leakiness, and 
for any degree of risk aversion, the degree of inequity aversion follows from 
(7a)
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where a is per capita aid received, A is total aid received, and λ is the degree of 
leakiness. Note that a and A are negative in donor countries.2 That is, aid is given up 
to the point that the welfare loss of the OECD exactly equals the welfare gain of the 
non-OECD. 
 
4. Results 
I solved in Equation (7) for λ=0.05, 0.1, 0.2, …, 0.9, 0.95, and consider results for 
various values of η. I took data on population, GNI, and ODA received for 1965-2005 
from the World Resources Institute (http://earthtrends.wri.org/). I took data for ODA 
given from the OECD Development Assistance Committee 
(http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats). I rescaled aid received per country so that total aid 
received equals total aid given for each year, time the leakage rate λ.3 
 
Figure 1 shows selected results per year. Table A1 has the full results. The top line is 
the consumption rate of inequity aversion, which equals either parameter if the other 
                                                 
 
2 Note that (1-ω)-1 and (1-η)-(1-ω) drop out of (6). 
3 Note that GNI is measured in dollars as exchanged on the currency market. Using Geary-Khamis 
dollars would substantially reduce the number of observations. Furthermore, this would imply λ>1, 
which does not match the observations below. 
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equals zero. In 1965, ω=0.79 (for η=0) and it steadily falls by 0.0060 (s.d. 0.0003) per 
year to ω=0.54 in 2005. That is, OECD countries have grown less averse to income 
differences with other countries. 
 
The numerical value of 1-(1-η)(1-ω) is also telling. It is lower than commonly 
assumed values for η – which is typically set at unity or higher (Evans, 2005). This 
implies that, for a reasonable choice of η, ω must be negative – that is, OECD 
countries display equity aversion rather than inequity aversion. This is shown in 
Figure 1 as well. For η=1.0, ω<0. For η=0.5, ω>0, but only barely so in recent years. 
Figure 1 also shows the sensitivity to the leakiness of the bucket. The leakier the 
bucket, the greater the implied rate of inequity aversion. 
 
5. Conclusion 
I measure the pure rate of inequity aversion as expressed in development aid flows 
from the OECD to developing countries, parameterised on the effectiveness of such 
aid. The consumption rate of inequity aversion is smaller than the rate of risk 
aversion, even if only a small fraction of aid given reaches its target. This implies that 
the pure rate of inequity aversion is negative, as result that contrasts with other results 
based on surveys and experiments (Amiel et al. 1999; Saelen et al., 2008). Note, 
however, that I measure the rate of global risk aversion of the rich countries. An 
alternative interpretation is therefore that the people at the top end of the global 
income distribution consider the gap between rich and poor to be fair or indeed not 
wide enough. 
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Figure 1. The pure rate of inequity aversion (ω) between 1965 and 2005 for different 
values of risk aversion (η) and leakiness (λ). 
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Table A1. The value of 1-(1-η)(1-ω) for different leakage rates and different years. 
Year\ λ 1.00 0.95 0.90 0.80 0.70 0.60 0.50 0.40 0.30 0.20 0.10 0.05 
1965 1.000 0.982 0.963 0.922 0.875 0.822 0.759 0.682 0.584 0.446 0.213 -0.019 
1966 1.000 0.982 0.964 0.924 0.879 0.827 0.766 0.691 0.595 0.461 0.234 0.000 
1967 1.000 0.983 0.964 0.925 0.880 0.828 0.767 0.693 0.598 0.465 0.239 0.014 
1968 1.000 0.982 0.963 0.922 0.875 0.822 0.759 0.683 0.585 0.449 0.220 -0.007 
1969 1.000 0.983 0.965 0.926 0.882 0.832 0.773 0.701 0.609 0.481 0.265 0.053 
1970 1.000 0.983 0.965 0.926 0.881 0.831 0.771 0.699 0.607 0.479 0.263 0.052 
1971 1.000 0.983 0.965 0.926 0.882 0.832 0.773 0.701 0.610 0.482 0.267 0.056 
1972 1.000 0.983 0.965 0.925 0.881 0.831 0.771 0.699 0.608 0.480 0.266 0.057 
1973 1.000 0.983 0.966 0.928 0.885 0.836 0.778 0.708 0.619 0.495 0.287 0.000 
1974 1.000 0.983 0.966 0.928 0.885 0.836 0.779 0.709 0.619 0.494 0.285 0.000 
1975 1.000 0.983 0.964 0.925 0.881 0.830 0.770 0.698 0.606 0.479 0.264 0.054 
1976 1.000 0.983 0.964 0.924 0.880 0.829 0.769 0.697 0.605 0.477 0.264 0.054 
1977 1.000 0.982 0.963 0.922 0.876 0.823 0.762 0.688 0.594 0.463 0.247 0.035 
1978 1.000 0.982 0.964 0.924 0.879 0.828 0.768 0.696 0.604 0.477 0.265 0.059 
1979 1.000 0.982 0.963 0.922 0.876 0.823 0.762 0.689 0.596 0.468 0.256 0.051 
1980 1.000 0.982 0.964 0.924 0.879 0.827 0.768 0.696 0.605 0.479 0.272 0.071 
1981 1.000 0.982 0.964 0.923 0.878 0.827 0.767 0.694 0.603 0.476 0.267 0.065 
1982 1.000 0.982 0.964 0.924 0.880 0.829 0.770 0.699 0.609 0.485 0.278 0.079 
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 1983 1.000 0.982 0.964 0.924 0.879 0.828 0.768 0.697 0.606 0.481 0.274 0.073 
1984 1.000 0.983 0.965 0.926 0.882 0.832 0.774 0.705 0.616 0.494 0.290 0.092 
1985 1.000 0.983 0.965 0.926 0.882 0.832 0.774 0.704 0.616 0.494 0.291 0.093 
1986 1.000 0.984 0.966 0.929 0.887 0.840 0.784 0.717 0.632 0.514 0.317 0.124 
1987 1.000 0.984 0.968 0.933 0.893 0.848 0.795 0.730 0.649 0.535 0.345 0.159 
1988 1.000 0.985 0.970 0.937 0.899 0.856 0.806 0.745 0.667 0.559 0.376 0.198 
1989 1.000 0.986 0.970 0.938 0.901 0.859 0.809 0.749 0.672 0.565 0.386 0.210 
1990 1.000 0.986 0.971 0.938 0.901 0.859 0.809 0.749 0.672 0.566 0.388 0.213 
1991 1.000 0.985 0.970 0.937 0.900 0.857 0.807 0.747 0.670 0.563 0.384 0.209 
1992 1.000 0.986 0.971 0.939 0.903 0.861 0.813 0.754 0.680 0.576 0.404 0.236 
1993 1.000 0.986 0.971 0.938 0.902 0.861 0.812 0.753 0.679 0.576 0.404 0.236 
1994 1.000 0.986 0.972 0.940 0.905 0.865 0.818 0.761 0.689 0.589 0.422 0.260 
1995 1.000 0.986 0.971 0.940 0.904 0.863 0.816 0.758 0.685 0.583 0.414 0.250 
1996 1.000 0.985 0.970 0.937 0.900 0.858 0.809 0.750 0.675 0.572 0.400 0.233 
1997 1.000 0.986 0.971 0.938 0.902 0.860 0.811 0.752 0.678 0.574 0.403 0.236 
1998 1.000 0.986 0.970 0.937 0.900 0.858 0.809 0.749 0.673 0.569 0.395 0.226 
1999 1.000 0.985 0.970 0.937 0.899 0.857 0.807 0.746 0.670 0.564 0.388 0.217 
2000 1.000 0.986 0.971 0.938 0.902 0.860 0.811 0.752 0.677 0.574 0.402 0.236 
2001 1.000 0.986 0.972 0.940 0.905 0.864 0.817 0.759 0.686 0.584 0.414 0.249 
2002 1.000 0.986 0.972 0.941 0.906 0.865 0.818 0.761 0.688 0.587 0.420 0.258 
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2003 1.000 0.987 0.974 0.944 0.911 0.873 0.828 0.775 0.706 0.611 0.455 0.303 
2004 1.000 0.987 0.973 0.943 0.909 0.871 0.825 0.771 0.701 0.605 0.445 0.291 
2005 1.000 0.987 0.974 0.946 0.913 0.876 0.832 0.779 0.711 0.616 0.458 0.304 
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